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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explain the relationship between economic
performance and labour manoeuvrability of township-village enterprises in the
Jiangsu province, China. We start with a general overview of the development in the
Chinese economy and the functioning of labour markets. Next, we perform a
statistical analysis on economic performance and labour market behaviour based on a
sample of 103 enterprises. The flexibility to fire employees turns out to have a
considerable impact on growth in added value of the enterprises, whereas hiring
flexibility appears to have negligible effects.
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Introduction
Political-economic driving forces have exerted a major impact on regional
development in China. From 1978 onwards, the Chinese economy has undergone a
transformation process from a central state economy to a socialist market economy. In
this context, we have observed not only the emergence of private enterprises, as we
know them in western economies, but also those enterprises that through government
control and ownership structures fall somewhere in between private enterprises and
governmentally managed companies (Chang and Wang, 1994). These are not state-
owned, collective enterprises, but they do neither exactly qualify as being privately
structured. These so-called Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) are controlled by
their Township-Village Government (TVG), which distinguishes them from genuine
private enterprises. Local ownership and its distributional effect differentiate a TVE
from a state owned enterprise (SOE). When we compare such TVEs with state-owned
enterprises, TVEs have disadvantages in terms of labour skills, technology,
educational levels of staff, access to bank loans and government support. But the
disadvantages are outweighed by the advantages in ownership and governance
structures, personal contact systems and labour relations, and conditions of
institutional arrangements (Perotti et al., 1999 and Sun, 2001). . Fujitu and Hu (2001)
found that areas with a decline of the share of state-owned enterprises and the growth
of TVE had a significant influence in aspects of income distribution and production
agglomeration.
Notwithstanding positive results, there is much discussion about the TVE sector
including the issue of property rights (or the lack thereof). Another important
phenomenon is the positive economic performance of the TVEs. Trust in community
relationships of a TVE type would be a plausible response to this and these issues
have often been mentioned and documented. However, the labour market adjustment
in TVEs is as yet not extensively documented in the literature. An interesting
contribution on labour market flexibility in Taiwan can be found in Van der Meulen
Rodgers and Nataray (1999). Impacts of the growth of TVEs on regional economic
growth has been studied by Fujita and Hu (2001). They found that the income and
2production levels of regions with a considerable decline of the share of state-owned
enterprises and a considerable growth of TVEs diverges considerably from regions
where the growth of TVEs do not appear.
In this paper we analyse the high flexibility in labour adjustment by simply hiring and
firing personnel as well as the potential positive relationship with a firm’s economic
performance. In the non-state sector, job mobility is more widespread and labour is
even recruited in other regions (Lu and Perry, 1997). The extent to which this takes
place is however, unclear, and whether or not recruitment occurs in an efficient way
also remains to be seen.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We start by elaborating on the
phenomenon of TVEs and the relationship with the Chinese economy. In particular,
we focus on the Chinese labour market and its institutional settings. Next, we describe
the research design and interpret the outcomes of our statistical analysis, where the
focus is on labour flexibility and economic performance of the TVEs. We will also
offer concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
Framework of the Township-Village Enterprises
The Chinese Economy
The purpose of this section is threefold. First, we will describe the institutional
framework of the Chinese economy. In the second place, labour markets and labour
migration will be discussed, and finally we will pay attention to the phenomenon of
township enterprises.
The Chinese economy is a counter example for many (former centrally-controlled)
economies in transition. The Chinese economy can be considered as a socialist market
economy, where the reforms take place gradually. For a general informative overview
of recent developments of the Chinese economy we refer to Chai (1997).
An important emerging sector in the Chinese economy is the rural industry. The
growth in this industry has always been closely related to agricultural conditions.
Initially, the agricultural sector gave financial support to rural non-state enterprises:
the township-village and private enterprises (see Haiyan, 1990). By 1984, this
situation was reversed and part of the profit from the TVE-industry was transferred to
agriculture.
3Important for the performance of the TVEs is the system of rural communities,
which can concisely be described as follows. The highest government level is the
country level. China is divided into 31 provinces, which include three city-provinces
and 5 autonomous areas. The (regular) provinces are split up into (urban and rural)
counties. In some cases there are “city-regions”. These regions cover not only the city
itself, but also the entire surrounding area. In this case, a city can include more
counties and towns. Another example of a region can be an area inhabited by a
minority. In general however, the level below the province level is the county level.
From the next level onwards, a specific division can be made for China’s rural sector.
There are three levels of rural communities (Byrd en Lin, 1990):
• The Township (Xiang): formerly the Commune. This is now the lowest level in
China’s governmental hierarchy. It has an articulated government structure and
the typical township has a population of some 15,000 - 30,000 people. At the
township level, the party committee is in charge and the township government
carries out routine administrative duties, such as allocating procurement quotas,
enforcing the implementation of the quotas and collecting taxes. In addition, the
township government oversees the running of township enterprises and provides
hospitals and high schools. The head of the township government is usually a
member of the party committee. The economic co-operatives at this level provide
financial services, agricultural input, supplies and services related to the marketing
of output (Carter et al., 1996);
• The Village (Cun): formerly the so-called Brigade. This is not a separate level of
government, but it does have governmental functions and a community structure.
Villages generally consist of a population falling in between one and two
thousand. A branch of the township party committee is in charge of the village.
The village committee has similar functions to the township government, but on a
smaller scale, such as managing village enterprises and providing health clinics
and elementary schools. The village committees have some economic co-
operatives, but not as many as exist at the township level;
• The Production Team (Cunmin Xiaozu): a “villagers small group”. A production
team generally consists of a group between 20 and 30 households or families, with
a total of about 150 people. The cunmin xiaozu is the equivalent of the former
production team. It owns the land (the central government establishes the length of
4land leases, currently thirty years), contracts out land-use rights to individual
households, and passes on a share of the mandatory procurement quotas to
individual households. It is also responsible for distributing tax obligations to each
household. Moreover, in some areas this unit provides machinery services and
customs work.
Spatial Labour Markets in China
In China the allocation of recruited workers depends on the type of vacancy. Most of
the lower educated workers are recruited from labour offices. These offices are left
over from the old days when they used to assign personnel to an enterprise.
Nowadays, a firm can recruit its own labour from these offices (in line with the
Western situation). Specialised labour, for instance, technically skilled labour, is even
hired from distant sources if necessary. Some workers within the firm may be given
training and schooling to fill a specific vacancy, but the greater part will be recruited
externally. For this specific type of recruitment, Chinese enterprises will go as far as
using head-hunters for finding suitable personnel. For high-level functions however,
China still relies strongly on the old methods. To climb the hierarchical ladder,
contacts used to be crucial. As mentioned, this situation is changing; however, the so-
called ‘nepotism’ still exists, especially for high-level functions. This might very well
be a reason for unmotivated workforces and low productivity.
To understand migration in China’s rural areas it is necessary to look at the spatial
labour market boundaries. Xin (1990) recognises three types of labour markets and a
set of data is given on labour flows between the different institutional levels. The
three levels of labour markets are defined as follows: (1) interregional: among
provinces and counties, (2) intercommunity: among villages and townships in the
same county and (3) intra-community: among firms in the same community. Xin’s
research on recruitment of personnel shows this to be significantly less from outside
the intercommunity labour market level than from inside.
A very important point of discussion in the context of labour-migration is the issue
of the Resident Registration System (the hukou system). In the early 1950s, the
communist government chose to give top priority to the development of heavy
industry. In this capital-scarce economy, it was necessary to introduce a package of
policies to reduce the production costs of heavy industry. A “cheap food” policy and
5urban housing subsidies reduced urban labour costs. In order to maintain this urban-
biased regime, the commune system tightly controlled farm-worker migration, thereby
preventing rural workers from moving into the cities. At this point the government
also introduced the hukou system, which treated the urban and rural population
differently, so that the number of subsidised urban residents was limited (Carter et al.,
1996). With resident registration it became virtually impossible for a person to move
to another region or province for the purpose of work. The consequences of this
resident registration system are numerous. If a person wants to seek a job at location
A, but has his registration at point B, migration becomes very difficult. It remains
possible for him to start working in A (provided he can find work, of course), but the
implications are far-reaching. First of all, the worker will probably have to be satisfied
to earn lower wages than his colleagues who have their hukou in location A. He will
also have to pay more for his housing and living and, finally, he will have to pay more
taxes (information based on interviews and conversations with Chinese in Jiangsu).
As previously mentioned, all these discouraging tactics are used as a method to
minimise relocation to the “popular” regions.
Under this hukou system most farmers will not give up their land, which is viewed
as a security of income because of the Household Responsibility System (HRS).
Under the HRS, individual households have become independent production units,
which maximise their income by optimising their resource allocation. Emigration, or
more precisely, employment seeking outside the home village, is not only a migrant
labourer’s own choice, but, more importantly, the choice of his or her entire family.
Chinese migrant labourers are not rootless and they are in fact insured by their
lawfully protected (under the HRS) farmland. With this land and the family as an
income buffer, the migrant labour wage is highly flexible and the migrant labour
market position is less risky. So, while the family stays home to insure the income
from the land, the migrant labourer goes out to seek a job in attractive regions.
Together with the money earned by his family at home, each income he makes is
additional.
Hence, despite the hukou system, labour migration persists. With the financial
backup of the family, people can work for lower wages and forgo formal resident
status. Because of the HRS, workers still choose to migrate, and although the hukou
system makes it hard, they can still earn more money than when they stay home. Once
migrated, workers are encouraged through the hukou system to (Wu et al, 1996):
6• save more by minimising their consumption in cities (in fact, by hardly
participating in urban social life)
• transfer money to their home villages rather than to invest in cities
• minimise their contributions to and even evade their tax obligations.
As a consequence, the hukou system results in a continuous flow of money and human
capital (return migration) back to rural areas, which stimulates the rural economy.
Urban enterprises these days are more willing to employ workers who do not have the
formal resident status. However, they experience difficulty in doing so, because the
current access to housing and public utility services is designed to benefit only formal
urban residents. Although the majority of the food subsidies has been eliminated by
the mid-1990s, housing subsidy as well as the HRS barrier to migration to the cities
still remain (Carter et al., 1996).
Township Village Enterprises
Before 1949, China was not known for its rural industry. By the early 1980s the
country (compared to other poor and populous economies such as those of South or
Southeast Asia) stood for a hothouse of rural industrialisation (Putterman, 1997).
Clearly the policy of the intervening years helped to spawn such industrial growth.
This resulted in an environment in which Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) came
into existence. The TVEs operate in this rural industry sector. The subsequent recent
shift to a more competitive, market-mediated economic environment did not mean the
end for the TVEs. On the contrary, assets and advantages ‘incubated’ in the Mao
period proved even more gainful in the more competitive and market-driven early
post-Mao era (Putterman, 1997).
The primitive stages of TVEs can be traced back to 1958, the time of the great leap
forward and the inception of the commune system. The communes set up many small-
scale industrial enterprises, and all of them failed shortly after. These failed
experiments were the first attempts at rural industrialisation in which community
governments played an essential role. During the nation-wide agricultural
mechanisation drive of the early 1970s, rural small-scale industrial enterprises rapidly
started to re-emerge. Most of these enterprises started as agricultural machine repair
shops and food processing mills. Many of them soon became subcontractors of State
7Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in nearby urban areas. These community enterprises were
known as commune and brigade enterprises (CBEs), the predecessors of the TVEs.
As constraints on non-farm activities were gradually relaxed, more and more
resources were freed for allocation in markets, so that both purchasing power and
investible resources grew, and the growth of CBEs and their successors accelerated,
mainly due to the higher farm prices of the early reform era. Since 1979, the TVEs
have become the most dynamic sector in the Chinese economy. As the HRS replaced
the commune production scheme in agriculture, the community government shifted its
focus to rural industrialisation. In 1984, with the abolition of the commune system,
the central government renamed commune and brigade enterprises as township and
village enterprises.
In the 1980s the TVEs continued to have favourable access to financial resources,
due to both retention of profits and the close ties between rural banks and rural local
governments. Moreover, the entrepreneurial and organisational capabilities of local
governments continued to offer support to power the TVE engine. The TVE flexibility
and the relative absence of bureaucratic hurdles made them attractive partners for
foreign businessmen seeking to contract them for labour-intensive assembly and
processing work. At the same time, the low TVE wages and land costs appealed to
state enterprises looking to subcontract some of their own operations (Putterman,
1997).
The structural position of the TVEs was, however, now somewhat different from
that of their Mao-era predecessors. Reform opened up the opportunity for more
commercially-oriented activities, and the TVEs competed with state and urban
collective enterprises and with nascent private ones. The TVEs were in a privileged
position, because they had both greater manoeuvrability and sharper incentives (or
‘harder budget constraints’) than state enterprise counterparts. At the same time they
had superior access to funds and input in comparison to private enterprises.
Thus, TVEs played a large role in the emergence of a new ‘third sector’ of the
Chinese economy, a sector saddled with neither the rigidities of the state enterprises
nor the extractive quota burdens of staple agriculture. Moreover, this only truly
commercial part of an economy in transition to market co-ordination took centre stage
in the accelerated expansion of China’s economy. At the end of 1992, China had
48,200 townships and 806,000 villages. On average, each township with a population
of 18,000 has 8.2 township enterprises with 66 employees per enterprise. Each village
8with a population of approximately 1,000 has 1.4 village enterprises with 23
employees per enterprise (Wu et al., 1996)
Weitzman and Xu (1994) state that TVEs are vaguely defined co-operatives.
According to the official definition however, TVEs are collectively-owned enterprises
located in townships or villages. More specifically, the township or village that
establishes the TVE, owns the firm collectively. The property rights of TVEs can only
be executed collectively through the representative of the community. In practice, the
most common case is that a community government is regarded as the representative
of the residents, and thus is the de facto executive owner of the TVEs in the
community (Weitzman and Xu, 1994).
As regards the management of TVEs, it is typical that the control rights are partly
delegated to managers through a contract, officially called the management
responsibility contract. In a typical case, employees collectively sign a contract with
the executive owner, i.e. the community government. If the TVE is determined jointly
by the community governments and the employees (Weitzman and Xu, 1994),
workers in the TVE sometimes also have the right of vote to approve or disapprove
the TVG’s choice of a manager. For two obvious reasons managerial nominees are
hardly, if ever, disapproved of by the workers:
• The TVG has to initiate a vote. If it is satisfied with a manager, the TVG is not
required to initiate a vote. The manager can thus remain in office indefinitely;
• The TVG controls many other aspects of a local citizen’s life, including who can
work in the TVE. Workers therefore would rarely want a confrontational
relationship with the TVG.
However, since the local citizens officially own the TVE collectively, control by the
TVG means that there is a separation of ownership and control in the TVE (Chang et
al, 1994). This is, of course, also common in both capitalist firms and State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs). What differentiates the TVE from these other forms are the
source and the completeness of the control right of a non-owner. In capitalist firms,
managerial control is derived from the voluntary delegation of the right by the owners
through private contracting in a mutually beneficial manner (Chang et al., 1994).
Usually when the control right is delegated, mechanisms are also designed to force the
9manager to give up this right, should the firm consistently perform below an expected
level. Managerial control in capitalist firms, therefore, may be said to be conditional
or incomplete. In contrast, the control right of the centre over SOEs is derived from
state power. Unless the centre chooses to give up this right, there is almost no means
by which citizens can take back this right from the centre. Thus, the control of SOEs
by the centre is almost unconditional and absolute.
Higher government authorities appoint the TVG officials. Their control over the
TVE is also derived from state power. This is similar to the case of SOEs but different
from those of capitalist firms. Since there are no mechanisms for the local citizens as
the nominal owners to take back control from the TVG, the TVG’s control over the
TVE is more complete than managerial control of capitalist firms.
Several new developments concerning TVEs have emerged since 1994. These
developments have caused changes in the situation as described above (Wu et al.,
1996). One is the rise of the mixed corporate form known as “joint-stock co-
operatives”. Under this form, TVE shares are sold or distributed to TVE employees
and managers or community residents in the form of both “collective shares” (one-
person-one-vote) and conventional individual shares (one-share-one-vote).
Another development is the partial privatisation of TVEs, mainly in the form of
sales of control rights to managers and employees or to foreign investors. After the
partial privatisation, the community government continues to play a role in rural
industrialisation by concentrating its attention on investment in infrastructure (e.g.
power supplies, roads and harbours), co-ordination and urban planning, and other
conventional public works. In many cases, the community governments continue to
hold a minority stake in partially privatised former TVEs.
The third significant development, which will have potential impact on village-run
enterprises, is the direct election of village leaders by the village residents. By 1995,
about one-third of the villages had already formed “village self-governing charters”,
more than one half of the villages had established a “village resident congress” and
more than 90% of village residents had participated in the elections. China even
promoted direct elections in villages, and model villages were established in 63
counties, in 3,917 townships and in 82,266 villages.
To understand the issue of control and ownership within TVEs, Figure 1 attempts
to illustrate the internal and external strategic framework in which TVEs have to
operate. In this framework the TVE is presented as a strategic core, which can be
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visualised as a “reputation capital” or, in broad terms, “goodwill”. The strategic core
or internal structure of the TVE is presented as a combination of ownership and
control. The nominal ownership of the TVE is, as proposed by Chang and Wang
(1994), assigned to the local residents. In the beginning, the control rights rest with
the TVG; however, they shift from the TVG to the managers and skilled workers in
the TVE after some time. An arrow indicates this in Figure 1. This last issue finds
support in most recent new developments, as outlined above. Figure 1 also shows the
relevant external elements of TVEs, in particular other firms, the union, and the
(spatial) labour market. This paper particularly focuses on the latter aspect.
FIGURE 1
THE TVE AS AN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Source: Smyth (1997)
Different factors influence the spatial labour market of the TVE sector. One important
factor is the educational level of the workers. Lina (1990) provides data on the
educational level in the counties Nanhei and Shangro (see Table 1). In this Table, LSE
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worker stands for Local State Enterprise worker. TVP are rural non-state enterprises,
or township, village and private enterprises. The data in Table 1 do not add up to 100
per cent, because not all workers in the sample responded to this questionnaire.
Interestingly, the share of lower-educated workers is much higher in TVP enterprises.
TABLE 1
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF WORKERS IN NANHEI AND SHANGRO
(Percentages)
Educational level LSE
workers
TVP workers
No schooling 0.0 2.1
Primary school 2.5 23.9
Higher primary school 13.6 17.8
High school 38.3 39.3
Senior high school 25.9 17.5
Higher education 11.1 8.9
Source: Lina (1990, p. 405)
Another factor is the availability of jobs, which is influenced by, among other things,
the location factors of the region. This of course is very important in China, which is
such a large country with big differences in economic development per region. For the
TVE sector, as for all industries, the favourable regions are the provinces in the
coastal area. Economic development is more progressed here than in the more inland
provinces, as is the availability of labour.
In the light of this study on labour flexibility (and performance), other relevant
factors include wages and contracting systems. These two are closely related in the
TVE sector. With the introduction of the contract labour system in the 1980s, an
enterprise’s flexibility in selecting new workers and dismissing unsuitable ones was
definitely enhanced. Labour Decree No. 11 of 1983 extended the new system to the
employment of all new workers (Chai, 1997). Contract labour replaced tenured
labour. No longer were workers hired for life, but for a specific period of time, and so
the freedom of enterprises to hire, discipline and fire workers was reinforced.
The reforms also gave enterprises more freedom in determining the pay of
workers. Since 1983 the wage fund was no longer fixed, but was allowed to fluctuate
either wholly or partially in line with the enterprise’s performance. TVEs generally
suffer less state intervention, face a more complete market environment and enjoy
greater access to the labour market than state enterprises. Also, in general, local
labour supply and demand have a stronger effect on wages. Community governments,
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however, exercise varying degrees of control over their firms (Quhui et al, 1990). The
income of managerial personnel is composed of, for instance, basic wages, position
wages, floating wages and annual bonuses. Bonuses are in general related to
enterprise performance. The determining of workers’ incomes also varies widely in
different counties. Although the total wages are usually linked with enterprise profits,
the monthly earnings of workers are determined in completely different ways.
Township economic commissions can decide the amount, or it can consist of fixed
wages, piece rate wages and bonuses. Another method is based on piece-rate wages in
combination with bonuses (Quhui et al, 1990).
In the light of the considerations mentioned above, we may conclude that labour is
becoming less dependent. Contract systems have been implemented, while incomes of
workers, although decided quite differently from place to place, are based more on
productivity than on a basic wage. The effect of these two factors could be higher
labour mobility, which is an important fact to bear in mind in our further empirical
research on labour flexibility in TVEs.
Research Design, Data Collection and Results
Research Design
In an attempt to explain their economic performance, our research focuses on the
functioning of labour markets within the TVE sector. First, let us describe labour
manoeuvrability. In our analysis we take for granted that labour manoeuvrability is
influenced by flexibility and adjustment. Flexibility, in this case, can be defined as the
possibilities and capabilities of an enterprise in quickly hiring and firing personnel.
Labour adjustment is defined as the actual result of this flexibility.
The second step is the way labour manoeuvrability is measured. For this purpose a
questionnaire was designed. The questionnaire contained variables, which indirectly,
through adjustment and flexibility, affect the latent variable ‘labour manoeuvrability’.
Therefore, questions are used which measure the adjustment and the flexibility of an
enterprise, based on the descriptions given above. To measure flexibility, the
questionnaire comprised questions on TVE strategies regarding wages and
recruitment, and on managerial steps the enterprise has taken. As mentioned before,
the questions on adjustment focus more on the effect of the action undertaken. The
size of the group is a possible example of an adjustment indicator. Important other
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criteria for flexibility are: difficulty in firing, advance notification, vacancy duration,
job duration and the channel that was used to find new personnel. Most questions on
adjustment regard gender, schooling, previous occupation and origin. By using these
and several other questions in our questionnaire, an enterprise’s rate of
manoeuvrability is approximated. Figure 2 sketches a picture of how the most
important questions can indirectly indicate the rate of labour manoeuvrability.
Another major issue is economic performance. This can be measured by
implementing several performance indicators. The questionnaire uses added value,
realised profit, taxes and product variety change. Besides these four main indicators,
there is also another category. Three detailed questions related to the expansion plans
of an enterprise serve to provide a more precise picture of its performance. In the first
exploratory presentation of the results, it remains to be seen which of these five is the
appropriate indicator to be used in an analysis.
In addition to these main items, the questionnaire also sketches a complete picture
of each enterprise. Questions on personnel numbers, origin, education and the firm’s
institutional structure were used for this purpose. These questions mainly concern the
years 1997, 1998 and 1999.
FIGURE 2
INDICATORS OF LABOUR MANOEUVRABILITY
Hiring
Firing easy
Short notification
Low job and vacancy duration
Employees as providing channel
Flexibility
Group sizes
Gender
Schooling
Previous occupation
Origin
Adjustment
Labour Manoeuvrability
The questionnaire was distributed among TVEs in the Jiangsu province in the year
2000. Jiangsu is a relatively rich province in the generally rich eastern coastal part of
China. With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 719,995 million yuan, Jiangsu is the
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second largest region in China, after the province of Guangdong. With its 9 per cent
of China’s total GDP, Jiangsu is an important player in China’s economy. The
population of 71,820,000 however, also belongs to the five highest regions. Jiangsu
probably may not present us with a complete picture of the Chinese TVE sector, but it
does certainly present interesting data on the well-performing TVEs, which ultimately
is the most interesting input for our research.
Data collection
The data collection process resulted in a total of 103 completed questionnaires,
thereby covering TVEs throughout the Jiangsu province. This process can be
characterised by three subsequent stages. In the first stage we sent 180 copies by mail
to TVEs all over the province of Jiangsu. This mailing prompted a response of 29
copies. In the second stage, direct face-to-face interviews were held in the Wuxi
county. A total of 34 TVEs were visited in two different townships. This period was
also used as a test period to determine what difficulty enterprises might experience in
filling out certain questions. In the analysis, these problems will have to be taken into
account. The enterprises visited at that stage were all different to the 180 that were
sent a copy of the questionnaire by mail. This resulted in a subtotal of 63 questioned
TVEs. In the last stage, interviews were held in the vicinity of Nanjing. In this way, it
was possible to gather a number of 40 copies in a relatively short period. Again,
different enterprises were visited, so there was neither any overlapping, nor “checking
up” on TVEs that did not respond to the mailing.
Tables 2A-2D show the descriptive statistics of the sample size concerning firm-
related data. There are clearly two major structural forms, Collective and Private
enterprises. The Joint ventures are an important issue. They are mainly also private
enterprises, and as this category is actually almost twice as large, it is better
represented than the collectives. A large diversity can be seen in the size of the TVEs
and in the different performance indicators. The change in performance indicators
(respectively, percentage growth of the added value, realized profits, taxes and
product each per employee, abbreviated as PI) is measured as:
100*)
size
PI(/)
size
PI()
size
PI(PIofgrowth 1t1tt 



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A few TVEs were taken out of further research because their added values stood out
too much to be considered as reliable information. The economic growth rates can
clearly be seen from the indicators (Table 2C). It seems that added value is the most
robust and stable candidate among the indicators to be used in our empirical analysis.
Machinery is obviously the largest branch of industry; however there are other,
relatively small branches. Altogether, we note a great diversity within the TVE sector
(see Table 2D).
TABLE 2A
FIRM RELATED DATA: STRUCTURES
Frequency
(percentage)
Collective 36 (36.4)
Private 26 (26.3)
Foreign investment 5 (5.1)
Joint Venture 17 (17.2)
Limited 5 (5.1)
Collective and Joint 2 (2.0)
Private and Joint 7 (7.1)
Others 1(1.0)
TABLE 2B
FIRM RELATED DATA: TVE SIZES (Employees)
Year Mean Standard deviation
1997 355.9 640.8
1998 348.9 643.6
1999 372.7 767.2
TABLE 2C
FIRM RELATED DATA: GROWTH PER EMPLOYEE (In %)
Mean Standard deviation
Added Value 97-98 14.5 57.2
Added Value 98-99 17.6 56.3
Realised Profit 97-98 14.7 81.9
Realised Profit 98-99 152.3 773.7
Taxes paid 97-98 21.2 68.7
Taxes paid 98-99 62.5 297.7
Added products 97-98 106.2 278.1
Added products 98-99 1.3 61.7
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TABLE 2D
FIRM RELATED DATA: BRANCHES
Branch Frequency
(percentage)
Machinery 23 (22.5)
Food 4 (3.9)
Chemistry 15(14.7)
Clothing 5(4.9)
Building Materials 12(11.8)
Light Industry 7(6.9)
Zippers 2(2.0)
Fabrics 8(7.8)
Printing 5(4.9)
Electricity Utilities 5(4.9)
Painting 2(2.0)
Others 14(13.7)
TOTAL 102(100)
Tables 3A-3E show the descriptive statistics concerning the (new) personnel of the
TVEs. On average, the number of hires in a firm amounts to approximately one fifth
of the total employees; the firings to about five per cent. The informal recruitment
character of the TVEs is apparent from the fact that most employers are attracted with
the help of other employees (‘informal networking’) working in the TVE. The
employees are upgraded, because the number of employees educated at more than
upper middle school level is steadily increasing. The number of employees educated
at a lower middle school level remains rather substantial, however. Table 3D
illustrates the previous position of the hired and fired personnel. Of those fired, a
substantial number was previously unemployed, which may be of interest when
analysing the economic performance.
 TABLE 3A 
PERSONNEL RELATED DATA: GROUP SIZES (In % of total employees)
Persons Mean
(per 100 employees)
Standard deviation
(per 100 employees)
Hires 18.7 38.9
Fires 5.0 8.5
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TABLE 3B
PERSONNEL RELATED DATA: CHANNELS PROVIDING NEW PERSONNEL
Absolute Percentage
of total hires
Relatives and Friends 66 5.7
Employees 508 43.9
Poster 212 18.3
Paper 32 2.8
Radio 0 0
Television 21 1.8
Labour Office 212 18.3
Head Hunter 1 0.1
Walk-in 25 2.3
Students (“claimed” while still at school) 47 4.0
Others 33 2.8
Total 1158 100
TABLE 3C
PERSONNEL RELATED DATA: SCHOOLING CURRENT PERSONNEL
(In % of total of given year)
1997 1998 1999
No schooling 1.4 1.2 0.8
Not finished primary school 3.4 2.7 2.0
Primary school 8.7 8.4 6.6
Lower middle school 46.7 44.9 42.4
Upper middle school 25.8 26.6 26.4
Special or Technical school 9.4 10.9 15.2
Higher education 4.6 5.3 6.7
TABLE 3D
PERSONNEL RELATED DATA: PREVIOUS POSITION PERSONNEL
Hires Hires (%) Fires Fires (%)
School 206 17.8 4 1.8
Unemployed 230 19.9 89 41.2
Same job 254 21.9 43 19.9
Other job 159 13.7 80 37.0
Others 309 26.7 0 0
Total 1158 100 216 100
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TABLE 3E 
Personnel related data: duration of vacancies and jobs
Duration Mean Standard Deviation
Vacancy (in days) 13.9 26.1
Job (in months) 29.1 34.2
Correlation between flexibility and performance (added value)
Next, we aim to identify structural patterns among the variables flexibility and
performance. A correlation analysis of the data presented in the previous part results
in the following findings (see Table 4).
TABLE 4
CORRELATION MATRIX
Hires Hires by
Employees
Hires this
town
Hires other
province
Fires Fires
unemployed
Fires
this
Town
Fires other
province
Added Value .06
(48)
.09
(48)
.15
(48)
.17
(48)
.62**
(36)
.70**
(36)
-.00
(36)
.509
(36)
Note.—  number of observations in brackets
**relation is significant at a 5% significance level.
All together, the results presented in this section offer a broad spectrum of the
situation in the TVE sector. In a subsequent section a regression analysis will be used
to further test the relation between added value on the one hand, and labour flexibility
on the other. However, at this point some provisional conclusions can already be
drawn. It turned out that the strongest (and most positive) relation exists between the
fired personnel and the added value growth. Based on a review of the literature, this
was to be expected, since an enterprise tends to fire its least efficient people. It was
also mentioned that the former contract system within the TVE sector has been
changed mainly to a two-year contract system. These two-year contracts imply that,
on average, people will leave an enterprise sooner and that companies are more
prepared to fire people who are not performing well. Furthermore, it is no surprise to
see that there is no real correlation between the vacancy duration and the added value
growth. The average is not even two weeks, including a few really long periods. This
confirms the flexibility of enterprises, but it does not say much about the effects on
added value, since most durations are approximately the same. What is surprising is
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the fact that the hires do not seem to correlate with the added value growth. A possible
explanation for this could be that the recruitment of personnel is still mostly done
through specific contacts. This “nepotism” is known to affect the performance of an
enterprise.
Regressions
We will now present the results of various statistical explanatory experiments with
which we aim to find out whether labour manoeuvrability positively affects economic
performance. The model we investigated then reads as  follows:
where:
vPI is a performance indictor captured by the growth of the added value of a TVE
measured in relative ( RAV ) or absolute values ( AAV ); in terms of added value per
employee;
LM is the labour manoeuvrability which consists of flexibility and adjustment. The
linear model with variables to capture flexibility and adjustment of labour markets can
thus be formalized as:
where:
HIRES  is the number of employees hired per year, in absolute terms or in number of
hires divided by the total number of employees per year;
FIRES  is the number of employees fired per year, in absolute terms or in number of
fires divided by the total number of employees per year;
VACDUR  is the vacancy duration in months;
SCHOOL  is a vector of schooling characteristics which consists of number of
employees without schooling and number of employees receiving less than primary
schooling (depending on the most appropriate model, in absolute terms or divided by
the total number of employees per year). In the first analysis we also included the
following categories: primary school, lower middle school, upper middle school,
special (or technical) school and higher education. All categories were taken into
)(LMfPIv =
εβαααα +++++= SCHOOLVACDURFIRESHIRESPIv ’3210
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account in absolute and relative terms. Not all indicators shown in figure 2 are
operationalized in our model due to data limitations. Labour flexibility is reflected by
the number of hires, fires and vacancy duration. Labour adjustment is proxied by the
variable SCHOOL
Table 5 shows the results of five regression models with the growth of the relative
added value as the dependent variable and the number of hires and fires divided by the
firm size, schooling characteristics and vacancy duration as explanatory variables. We
also performed similar regressions with absolute added values, but they did not lead to
better results (see Table in the appendix).
TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MODEL WITH RELATIVE GROWTH OF
THE ADDED VALUE
Model I Model IIa Model IIb Model IIc Model IId
HIRESIZ -0.02 (-0.02) -0.24 (-0.24) -0.08 (-0.09) -0.15 (-0.16) -0.06 (-0.06)
FIRESIZ 3.66* (3.95) 2.89* (3.43) - (a)
FIRESIZ* FIRESIZ 7.85* (3.94)
F-UNEMPL 5.05* (3.94) -(b)
F-UNEMPL * F-UNEMPL 13.57* (3.99)
NOSCHOOLSIZ# -7.48 (-1.51) -2.27 (-1.19) -2.35 (-1.26) -2.36 (-1.27) -2.41 (0.20)
NOSCHOLFINSIZ# 1.75 (0.80) 1.78 (2.23) 1.55 (1.97) 1.53 (1.93) 1.45 (0.06)
VACDUR 0.00 (0.68)
Constant 0.01 (0.12) 0.06 (0.82) 0.08 (1.25) 0.09 (1.26) 0.10(1.46)
N 40 85 85 85 85
R2 0.46 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.23
Log Likelihood -20.22 -64.59 -62.61 -62.63 -62.43
Note.— Abbreviations used: HIRESIZ: number of hires divided by the number of employees,
FIRESIZ: number of fires (dismissals) divided by the number of employees, F-UNEMPL: fires
previously unemployed divided by the number of employees, NOSCHOOLSIZ: employees without
schooling divided by the number of employees, NOSCHOLFINSIZ: employees receiving less than
primary schooling divided by the number of employees, VACDUR: vacancy duration in months.
 (a), (b) Linear term is deleted because it turned out to be insignificant
#
 Other categories were deleted since inclusion did not improve the outcomes of the model.
In the first model (I), besides the number of hires, we included the firings divided by
the number of employees and schooling characteristics. Since we have limited data on
vacancy duration, the number of observations is 40 in this case. The number of
dismissals divided by the number of workers shows a positive tendency that is
significant for the relative growth in the added value. Model type II deletes the
vacancy duration, because in Model type I it does have an insignificant zero effect,
which might be partly due to the low number of observations of TVEs with a vacancy
in the sample. The effect of the firings divided by the number of workers is somewhat
smaller than in the first model, but nevertheless significant. We next continue by
21
estimating different specifications of model type II to search for the nature of the
firing effect. In the second version of Model type II, we included firings as a quadratic
term, and this turns out to have a considerable impact. Based on the correlation
analysis (Table 4), Model IIc uses the number of fires, defined as previously
unemployed divided by the number of employees; this appears to have more effect on
the relative growth of the added value than the total number of dismissals divided by
the number of employees employed in the previous models. The most considerable
impact can be found by using the dismissals of previously unemployed people divided
by the number of employees as a quadratic term, which is presented in Table 5 as
Model IId.
To sum up, firing workers does clearly enhance labour market performance of
TVEs whereas hiring workers does not. Especially the firing of - large groups of -
workers that have been previously unemployed appears to have a major impact on
added value growth.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed the impact of labour manoeuvrability on the economic
performance of township village enterprises (TVEs) in China. An empirical analysis
was carried out with the help of a data set based on the economic performance and
labour adjustment of TVEs in the Jiangsu province.
A first exploratory analysis showed that especially the total number of people fired
and those fired who were previously unemployed, is strongly correlated with the
relative growth of the added value. The TVEs fire their least efficient personnel first.
When firing them, they strongly improve their added value. Previously unemployed
people are considered less efficient and are therefore dismissed first. Furthermore, the
fact that hires do not correlate with the added value was explained by the ever-present
“nepotism” situation.
From the regression results we conclude that firing workers appears to be an
important determinant of the firm’s economic performance as reflected by the added
value growth. In contrast, the hiring of workers does not affect the added value
growth of the TVE’s. This finding is in line with our results revealed through the
correlations, but now we also take a multi-dimensional, causal structure of the data
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into account. Further investigation of the significant impact of fires has brought us the
insight that dismissing previously unemployed workers particularly enhances
performance. At the same time, it also becomes clear that firing large groups of
(previously unemployed) workers appears to be very effective to increase the
performance of the TVE. In other words, it turns out that massive downward
adjustment of the firm’s workforce (in relative terms) - as made feasible in the
Chinese economy by the lack of protective legislation – helps to increase substantially
the economic performance of that firm. Furthermore, it seems that workers who have
been laid-off before are the first candidates in the firm to accomplish such an
improvement in added value growth. This raises the interesting, but yet unanswered
issue in our field research whether social stigmatization of previously unemployed
workers plays a role in the selection process of dismissing those workers that are
perceived (justified or not) to be less productive.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE MODEL WITH ABSOLUTE GROWTH OF THE ADDED
VALUE
Model I Model IIa Model IIb Model IIc Model IId
HIRES 0.00
(-0.19)
0.00
(0.23)
0.00
(0.27)
0.00
(0.28)
0.00
(0.28)
FIRES 0.02
(1.71)
0.01
(1.06)
FIRES*FIRES 0.00
(1.18)
NOSCHOOL 0.01
(0.33)
0.00
(0.13)
0.00
(0.24)
0.00
(0.25)
0.00
(0.11)
NOSCHOLFIN 0.01
(-1.45)
0.00
(-0.52)
0.00
(-0.67)
0.00
(-0.69)
0.00
(-0.52)
FIRESIZ
(Previous unemployed)
0.04
(1.88)
FIRESIZ * FIRESIZ
(Previous unemployed)
0.00
(1.83)
VACDUR -0.00
(-0.03)
Constant 0.23
(1.91)
0.18
(2.36)
0.19
(2.60)
0.17
(2.39)
0.18
(2.52)
N 39 86 86 87 87
R2 0.102 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04
Log Likelihood -29.20 -78.87 -78.72 -78.10 -78.2
Note.— Abbreviations see Table 5.
